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Democracy as a system of governance and interest representation demands 
respect for dissent and opposition. It recognises the principle of majority rule and 
guarantees protection of minorities. Democracy also builds faith in electoral 
contestation to gain public office and gives legitimacy to political parties as primary 
instruments for acquisition and transfer of power from one set of individuals to 
another. Unfortunately, despite the significance of the above elements, no serious 
studies have been undertaken on Pakistan’s experimentation with democracy. Given 
a history of weak party system and prolonged military rule, most of the studies focus 
on the military, political parties, constitutional history, or in a descriptive way, 
attribute the failure of democracy to the inadequacies of the politicians [Ahmed 
(1987); Rizvi (1987); Callard (1957) and Afzal (1976)]. It is only recently that some 
theoretically meaningful and rigorous empirical writings have appeared on elections, 
procedures and practices of electoral contestation and on problems of transition from 
authoritarian regimes towards democracy [Waseem (1989); Wilder (1995); Talyor 
(1992); Rais (1997) and Shafqat (1997)]. 
It merits attention and recognition that among the Muslim states and 
developing world, Pakistan is one of those few states, where people have shown 
vigour and some vitality to adopt a democratic parliamentary system and through 
popular mass movements demonstrated disapproval of military dictatorships. An 
enduring feature of Pakistani culture, history and politics has been an aspiration for 
democracy [Hugh and Rose (1997)]. The passion for democracy continues to 
resurge, despite ethnic, social class, religious cleavages, strong authoritarian 
tendencies and prolonged military rule. There is no gainsaying that cultural and 
structural conditions weigh heavily against the promotion of democratic processes 
and institutions in Pakistan [Taylor (1995); Embree (1987); Gardezi (1983); Jalal 
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(1995) and Waseem (1989)]. The civil society has expanded, but is still weak, inspite 
of a number of non-governmental groups, formal associations, human rights 
organisations, autonomous bodies that have emerged over the years. Even the size 
and scale of political parties has risen. A number of regional parties, e. g., Awami 
National Party (ANP) and Baloch National Party (BNP) and Muthida Qaumi Mahaz 
(MQM) did gain representation in the federal structure during 1997-98. These were 
positive indications and generated hope in the democratic potential [Inayatullah 
(1997)].  However in the past one year, the PML (N) Government’s attempt to 
impose a majoritarian view of democracy (as manifested through the announcement 
of Kalabagh Dam, 15th Amendment and imposition of governor’s rule in Sindh) has 
roused skepticism among the smaller provinces and encouraged the formation of 
Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM). 
The prolonged military rule (1977–1988), obliterated democratic norms, 
stifled democratic values, yet aspiration for democracy continues to persist. For 
almost a decade (1988–1999) Pakistan has sustained a transition to parliamentary 
democracy. This has been the longest period of civilian led regimes, although, none 
of the elected governments have been able to complete its five year term in office. It 
is encouraging to note that the principle of electoral competition has gained strength. 
Electoral procedures have acquired stability. Despite presidential interventions 
(1988, 1990, 1993 and 1996) and dissolution of the assemblies, democratic creed has 
survived. Local Bodies Elections (May 20, 1998) in Punjab, (notwithstanding 
violence and allegations of rigging), reflect a growing confidence in the electoral 
principle. Similarly in Balochistan Local Bodies elections have been held (March, 
1999). Ironically, despite frequency of electoral competition, political leaders have 
not been successful in promoting an environment that would encourage the growth 
of democratic norms and civility. Popular aspiration for democracy has not received 
a corresponding support from the elected political leadership. Therefore, a strong 
tendency towards illiberal usages of democracy continues to threaten prospects of 
democratic consolidation. These contradictory processes are transforming the 
political landscape in Pakistan. 
 
SOME CRITICAL QUESTIONS 
How should we analyse this relationship between democratic transition and 
building of political institutions? What are the social forces of resistance and support 
to democracy? What is the role of political leaders and political parties in promoting 
or hampering democratic development in Pakistan? 
To respond to these questions, this paper would identify, analyse and evaluate 
the processes of value change and political transformation by focussing on four 
themes. (1) Electoral contestation and supremacy of the political—The elected public 
official; (2) electoral competition: Politics and District administration; (3) 
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parliamentarians and their disabilities to build parliamentary democracy; and (4) 
Political parties and challenges of democratic development. 
In this paper, at the theoretical level, an argument would be developed that 
democracy is a system of governance and interest representation in which supremacy 
of laws and procedures is a prerequisite. That the political leadership, élites and 
powerful interest groups need to strive, not only to uphold the rule of law, but also 
demonstrate respect for these and seek observance and compliance from a wider 
segment of citizens. 
Constructing and promoting democracy is not an easy task, it requires patience, 
time and, most importantly, a consensus among the powerful groups and élites in a 
society on the desirability of rule of law and governance through the consent of the 
people. Thus, the onus of responsibility for constructing democracy, promoting 
democratic norms, and institutionalising democratic practices and principles is on the 
élites. Political leaders and élites through their actions and conduct, influence the 
formation of democratic norms at the popular level. A large number of people in a 
society have to accept and demonstrate faith in democratic principles. In societies, 
where a gap between the élites and representatives of the people on professed 
principles of democracy and their actual conduct widens, people begin to loose faith in 
democracy. This study would sharpen our focus on this “gap” problem. 
 
BUILDING DEMOCRACY WITHOUT DEMOCRATS? 
For the purpose of this study political leadership is defined to convey the 
actions, policies, orientation, conduct and behaviour of top decision-makers of the 
political party in power, its allies and opposition party leaders. Focus on political 
leadership, as a unit of analysis, is meaningful and necessary because there is a 
growing consensus among public advocates and scholars that an “effective and 
committed leadership” does act as a facilitator for consolidating democracy. In 
societies like Pakistan, where institutional development has remained weak, self-
enriching and reckless policies of political leaders could further erode the 
institutions, therefore it becomes imperative not only to analyse the actions and 
policies of the political leadership, but also to sensitise them about the consequences 
that their decisions may have for society and the political system. 
In this context, it would be argued that the greatest stumbling block in 
democratic development has been the contradictory behaviour and attitude of 
Pakistani political leaders and élites. Despite making struggle for the restoration of 
democracy, they have failed to build a legal framework, create a pro-democracy 
environment, and most importantly, develop a policy framework in which conflicts 
may be resolved through negotiations, by making bargains, and by building 
consensus. Democracy cannot grow and function in the absence of élite-consensus. 
Those political leaders and élites who, while struggling for democracy, expressed 
democratic sentiments, upon assuming power, changed and demonstrated Saeed Shafqat  37:4, 284
authoritarian tendencies. They pursued or adopted policies that strengthened 
authoritarian attitudes rather than promote democratic norms, flout rule of law and 
defy tolerance of any political opposition. As a result of these tendencies, there is a 
growing skepticism about the sustainability of democracy. The disappointment is not 
with democracy as a form of government but with the conduct and behaviour of 
parliamentarians and political parties who are expected to make democracy work. 
The foundations of democracy are built on acceptance of rule of law among 
the wider number of members of the civil society. It is not to trivialise the 
significance of culture, social structure and level of economic development. 
Favourable disposition of these factors, certainly helps and brightens prospect of 
democratic development. It is only in this context that the rule of law, respect for 
procedures, fairplay and justice, equality before law—irrespective of caste, creed, 
religion or status, are the principles on which democracies are built. Democracy 
thrives on competition, fairplay and encourages merit. ‘Spoil’ system or distribution 
of rewards—i.e., extension of patronage to supporters of a political party is one small 
aspect of democratic process. Because in a democracy political parties compete to 
gain power to pursue and implement specific policies for public good. The 
expectation is that a particular party will be in power for a certain period of time. 
Therefore, in order to implement the policies, that it advocates, the groups that it 
represents, it needs political activists and ideologues to achieve its goals. Thus, for 
political parties, patronage system and democracy grow side by side. On the other 
hand, electoral process and political parties are not expected to obstruct merit, 
achievement—orientation or citizen’s right to compete, excel and advance their 
interests. In a number of developing countries, like Pakistan, where aspiration for 
democracy is strong, but pro-democracy groups, and political parties are weak, 
retaining this distinction between spoil system and pursuit of merit becomes 
complicated. This complication rouses skepticism—about civil society’s ability to 
respect the rule of law. 
 
(1)  Electoral Contestation and Supremacy of the Political— 
       the Elected Public Official 
Do elections promote supremacy of the elected public official over the 
bureaucracy? Let me examine and weave a relationship between electoral process 
and transformation of administrative institutions. 
Elections and electoral process has brought about a change in the attitude of 
political parties and their leaders. Until the first general elections of 1970, the 
political leaders and parties generally accepted the superiority and lawful authority of 
the bureaucratic élites. Between 1947–1970, there were rarely any demands for 
posting and transfers of the public officials. However, once the PPP, assumed power 
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officials began to establish supremacy of the elected on the non-elected public 
officials. Bhutto redefined the basis of political leader—bureaucracy relationship. 
The 1973 Administrative Reforms were a turning point in the history of 
Pakistani bureaucracy [Kennedy (1987)]. Through these reforms, Bhutto sought to 
establish civilian supremacy over bureaucracy. His goal was that, at the macro-level, 
the bureaucracy should accept the supremacy of the political leadership and 
representative institutions. He sought to alter the structural balance in favour of the 
political leadership. He did not encourage interference in the workings of 
government at the micro level. Bhutto government (1971–77) could be criticised for 
his over-enthusiasm in venturing to establish political dominance over state 
institutions (i.e., military and bureaucracy). Nevertheless, Bhutto’s approach gave a 
new sense of confidence to political parties and their leaders, who in subsequent 
years, began to aspire for civilian supremacy over the state institutions. This ushered 
in a change in political values. General Zia-ul-Haq’s martial Law (1977–1985) 
attempted to reverse this trend, by delegitimising politics at the national level and by 
encouraging Local Bodies elections. Thus, Zia attempted to restore the colonial 
model of politics, where local influentials could be co-opted to pursue political 
ambitions under the guidance and patronage of district administration, i.e., ensuring 
continuity of bureaucratic authority on policy and administrative matters. Party-less 
Local Bodies elections were held in 1979, 1983, 1987. The regime’s strategy was not 
only to initiate and promote new individuals and groups into the political arena, but 
also to delegitimise the role and significance of leaders who had become members of 
the parliament on the basis of affiliation with political parties. In pursuance of this 
objective, Zia regime formulated a policy through which members of the Local 
Bodies were given developmental grants to improve upon health, education, road-
building and utilities development net works in their constituencies. Zia met limited 
success, but, in the process, facilitated the emergence of local influentials in the 
national political arena. As soon as the 1985 party-less elections gave birth to 
parliament and restored the democratic process, the elected public officials began to 
work for their supremacy with new zeal. The government of prime minister 
Mohammed Khan Junejo upgraded the same programme of granting a 
developmental grant of Rs 50 lakh to each Member of the National Assembly. This 
development grant was funnelled through Public Works Department (PWD), Local 
Government, Communication and Works Department (C and W) and the district 
administration. Thus, emerged a new nexus of politician and administrator. In a 
number of instances, these grants were not properly utilised, funds were 
misappropriated and in some cases were usurped by politicians for self-enrichment. 
At the popular level, democracy was seen as promoting corruption and not 
development. Armed guards and Pajeros emerged as new symbols of power and 
authority in the rural setting. Thus, with each electoral contest, the candidates not 
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compensation for their votes. The contestants to the parliament came under pressure 
from their constituents to obtain jobs, resolve their problems and secure 
development. The voters also saw elections as an opportunity to advance their 
interests. Thus a value change occurred. 
Electoral experience of Pakistan during 1985-1997, reveals a pattern; after 
each election (i.e. 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997), the political leaders not only gained 
greater autonomy, but become more vigorous in pursuing their supremacy. In the 
process, they were driven by the demands of their constituents and personal interest 
(i.e. providing jobs to members of their constituency, promoting some developmental 
work through administrative help, seeking the removal of grievances of their voters 
and developing a personal connection with the public officials working in their sub-
division/district). Interestingly, the electoral process has accentuated two trends. 
First, political interference in the administration has increased. Secondly, it has 
promoted demands of administrative decentralisation, in return, paving the way for 
the creation of new districts and sub-divisions. 
 
(2)  Electoral Competition: Politics and 
       District Administration 
The impact of Local Bodies elections was that local issues (i.e., caste, biradri 
rivalry, seeking patronage for developmental grants and schemes) acquired political 
salience. Thus, the military regime curbed politics at the national level but facilitated 
non-party electoral competition at the local level. Therefore, the politicians and new 
entrants to politics began to work for creating greater autonomy for themselves and 
demanded creation of new districts. In 1982, two new divisions, Faisalabad and 
Gujranwala were created in the Punjab. Subsequently, (between 1982–1988), 
Rajanpur, Leiah, Bhakkar, Khanewal, Khushab, Toba Tek Singh, Okara and 
Chakwal were created as new districts. In the post-1988 period, Lodhran, Mandi 
Bahauddin, Pakpattan, Hafizabad, Narowal were made new districts. Similarly 
Gujrat was transferred from Rawalpindi Division to Gujranwala Division. 
In the rural setting and administrative structure of Pakistan, district is the 
primary unit of administration. Since 70 percent of the constituencies are rural, 
political, economic and administrative activity revolves around the district. A 
hundred years ago, writing in 1892, this is how W. W. Hunter described the pivotal 
role of the Deputy Commissioner for the British Raj: 
Upon his energy and personal character depends ultimately the efficiency 
of our Indian government. His own special duties are too numerous and 
so various as to bewilder the outsider. 
He is a fiscal officer, charged with the collection of revenue from the land 
and other sources; he also is a revenue and criminal judge, both of first 
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duties. He does in his smaller local sphere all that the Home Secretary 
Superintendent in England, and a great deal more; for he is the 
representative of paternal and not of a constitutional government. Police, 
jails, education, municipalities, roads, sanitation, dispensaries, the local 
taxation, and the imperial revenues of his District are to him matters of 
daily concern. He is expected to make himself acquainted with every 
phase of the social life of the natives, and with each natural aspect of the 
country. He should be a lawyer, an accountant, a surveyor, and a ready 
writer of state papers. He ought also to possess no mean knowledge of 
agriculture, political economy, and engineering. 
Could one seriously expect the Deputy Commissioner to perform these 
multifarious tasks in today’s Pakistan? During the British Raj and early years of 
Pakistan, the District Officer performed all the traditional roles of a Deputy 
Commissioner i.e. a revenue collector, administrator, a magistrate, a development 
planner and a patron of the district. However, with expansion of political process, 
these functions of the district officer underwent change as elected public officials 
begun to establish their supremacy. The local councillors, the members of provincial 
assemblies, and the national assembly became more assertive about advancing their 
self-interests and at times interests of their constituents. The elected public officials 
insist to control and regulate the social and political life in their districts. If and when 
district administration does not comply with their demands, they seek posting and 
transfers of the officers. This clearly demonstrates that district continues to be the 
pivot of political and administrative interaction. 
It is not merely influence with the District Administration that the politicians 
seek, but to consolidate structural presence, they also seek appointments in the 
district administration. The Local Councillors, Members of National and Provincial 
Assemblies (MNA/MPAs) demand recruitment of their relatives or supporters for the 
appointment of Tehsildars/Naib Tehsildars, Inspector/Sub Inspectors of Police, 
school teachers, lady health visitors, and petty clerks. In Punjab, between 1985-1990, 
an estimated 2000 Assistant Inspectors of Police, Tehsildars, Naib Tehsildars were 
recruited [The Friday Times (1997)]. These appointments were made either on the 
recommendations of the Chief Minister or parliamentarians. This practice has 
continued; its pace and scale has increased since 1990. Each successive government, 
whether belonging to the PPP, the PML (N), caretaker or coalition, has continued 
this practice. Resultantly, democratisation has strengthened the paternalistic model of 
administration rather than constitutional government. The current chief minister, 
Shahbaz Sharif has brought about a change. He has revived and reactivated the 
Punjab Public Service Commission (PPSC) for recruitments in the Punjab Police and 
administration. In the provinces of Sindh, Balochistan and NWFP, similar practices 
of creating new districts and recruitment of subordinate administrative class were 
pursued and continue to be in vogue. Through these devices, the political parties and Saeed Shafqat  37:4, 288
their parliamentary leaders, have built a structural presence in the provincial 
administration. 
Interestingly, the mystique of the office of the Deputy Commissioner persists 
but its glory and reputation have been tarnished, functioning undermined, and 
authority eroded. The donor agencies like the World Bank, IMF, UNDP and other 
Reform Commissions, when they suggest that the Office of Deputy Commissioner 
be abolished, they fail to comprehend that district as an administrative unit and 
Deputy Commissioner as the administrator complement each other. How can you 
demolish the post of Deputy Commissioner, without dismantling the district? Unless 
a new basis for an administrative unit is created, the deputy commissioner would not 
only continue to be relevant but will remain the principal coordinating officer not 
only of the district, but also as the primary arm of the provincial government and a 
basic link with the federation. 
As a result of this changing nature of relationship between the politician and 
the bureaucrat, democracy has considerably eroded the authority of the 
administrative institutions.  The politics of patronage has promoted corruption, and 
recruitment of henchmen of politicians has strengthened the authoritarian streaks in 
the existing feudal social order. Furthermore, democratisation has led to the 
development of illiberal tendencies, partisanship, lack of tolerance and distrust in the 
fairness of administration. These have been the negative fall out effects of 
democratisation. Unless, “constitutional government” is allowed supremacy over 
“paternal government”, democratisation would breed politicisation, 
maladministration, impartiality, corruption and deepen the crisis of governance. 
 
(3)  Behavioural Pattern of Political Leadership and 
       Socio-economic Profile of the Parliamentarians 
In a democratic system, the political leadership is expected to coordinate 
between the expectations and demands of its support groups and the groups that are 
not fully supportive of their leadership [Weingast (1997)]. The task of the leadership 
is to establish a framework on the basis of which uniform and credible principles of 
political game may evolve. Pakistani experience reveals a two-fold predicament. 
First, a growing disharmony between the political leadership’s professed democratic 
creed and authoritarian policies and practices. This disharmony has considerably 
damaged the sustainability of democracy. 
Secondly, political leadership in Pakistan reveals a coordination dilemma. On 
the one hand it aspired, and in some cases, has struggled to restore democracy, 
espoused greater participation of masses into political process, promised to build 
constitutionalism, promote liberal democracy, uphold rule of law and, yet, in its 
conduct and behaviour portrays an equally strong dispensation towards autocratic 
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Let me exemplify some of these contradictions. In the 1970s, Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto rose to political eminence portraying himself and perceived by the public as a 
democrat. He was inducted into Ayub Khan’s military regime, and remained 
associated with it from 1958–1966. He disassociated himself from the regime and 
recreated an image for himself and founded Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in 
November 1967. Through mass mobilisation, ‘socialist’ ideology and organisational 
network, the PPP was developed into a national party. Bhutto did not encourage 
elections within the party; instead, he nominated persons to the membership of the 
central executive committees and various other levels—national, provincial, local. 
The membership of the party expanded, but organisational structure was kept weak 
and under personal control [Syed (1992)]. On assuming power, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 
(1971–77) was skillful and successful in formulating and adopting a constitution for 
Pakistan through parliamentary consensus. However, his personal conduct and 
political style contributed little in promoting rule of law. He could not curb his 
authoritarian propensities, when through a series of constitutional amendments, he 
restricted freedom of judiciary, freedom of press, and even freedom of religion (i.e., 
in 1974 Ahmedis were declared a minority). The attitude and behaviour of 
opposition political parties was equally hostile and confrontational. The government 
and opposition leaders demonstrated a coordination dilemma—they failed to iron out 
their differences, on the functioning of parliamentary democracy. These disabilities 
of political leaders, encouraged the military to disrupt the fragile quasi-democratic 
set up. 
General Zia’s rule (1977–1988) weakened the civil society; participatory 
processes, democratic norms and values were further mutilated. Political parties 
endured, but their organisational capacity was restricted. The military rule, though 
harsh on civil and religious freedoms, could not suppress democratic aspirations 
among the public. Therefore, underneath his autocratic rule, tension between pro-
democracy and anti-democracy forces persisted. General Zia-ul-Haq was skillful in 
encouraging and expanding the base of religious groups, trader-merchants and other 
right-wing groups [Shafqat (1997)]. In 1981, political leaders with feudal 
background and support base, along with urban professionals, launched a pro-
democracy alliance—the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD). The 
MRD demanded removal of martial law and called for holding of elections. These 
demands eventually paved the way for restoration of democracy in 1985. 
Mohammed Khan Junejo, who was handpicked by Zia-ul-Haq as prime minister 
(1985–1988), demonstrated democratic dispensation, and allowed the return of 
Benazir Bhutto to Pakistan. He also promoted an environment in which opposition 
political parties could function. Simultaneously, Junejo revealed a strong propensity 
to establish the dominance of Muslim League. He introduced a scheme of granting 
developmental funds to the members of the parliament, essentially those of his own 
party, for development and welfare purposes in their constituencies. He was 
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relationship. Before he could stabilise party rule and processes of democratic 
institution-building, he was removed. Muhammad Khan Junejo is not given the 
credit that he deserves. Among the political leaders, he stands out as a prime minister 
who showed tolerance towards opposition political parties, showed respect for rule 
of law and encouraged an environment for the freedom of press and above all created 
space for consensus-building.  
From 1988 to 1998, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, who, in many ways, 
represent a new generation of leaders, created an expectation for democratic rule. Both in 
their own ways restored and reorganised their respective political parties, i.e., PPP and 
PML (N). Both created expectation about upholding the rule of law. As opposition 
leaders, in a limited way, they contributed towards expansion of democratic processes. 
But both have shown strong, autocratic tendencies, as soon as they assumed power. 
Instead of upholding the rule of law, both have flouted it, both have shown little respect 
for minority rights and views, both have suppressed dissent and restricted opposition. 
Both have made little effort in engaging the opposition parties and government into a 
dialogue and create conditions for consensus-building. Through incongrument policies 
and bad laws, both have encouraged social attitudes that promote undemocratic norms 
rather than building mutual trust, accommodation and dialogue. 
Both PPP and PML (N) continue to be the dominant political parties, and 
share almost 62 percent of the total votes polled in various elections (see Table1). 
Both have preferred to establish a dominant party system rather than encouraging the 
growth of a two party system. Both have deepened crisis of governance and 
polarised the society (see the voting  percent of both). Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif 
has a unique opportunity to engage opposition political parties in a dialogue on 
issues of vital national significance and promote an environment of national healing, 
reconciliation and consensus building. Failure to act now could intensify social 
disharmony and political violence. 
 
Table 1 
Party Share of Votes: All-Pakistan National Assembly Elections 
  1988 1990 1993 1997 
















PML (N)/IJI  30.16  54… 37.37  106… 39.86 72… 45.88 134… 
PPP/PDA 38.52 93… 36.83  44… 37.85 86… 21.80 18… 
MQM 5.37  13… 5.54  15… – –… 3.55 12… 
JUI (F)  1.84  7… 2.94  6… 2.4 4… 1.61 2… 
ANP 2.09  2… 1.68  6… 1.67 3… 2.31 9… 
JWP/BNA 0.36  2… 0.61  2… 0.27 2… 0.29 2… 
BNP –  –… –  –… – –… 0.66 3… 
PKMA/PMAI 0.24  0… 0.35  1… 0.49 3… 0.33 0… 
Others 1.92  6… 4.38  5… 12.46 21… 9.2 2… 
IND 19.50  27… 10.30  22… 7.40 15… 14.37 22… 
  100  204 100 207 100 202 100 204 
Source:  The Herald, March 1997. Democracy: Value Change and Challenges of Institution Building  37:4, 291
Is the electoral contestation fair and provide equal opportunity to all 
contesting groups? The experience of Pakistan reveals that, whereas electoral 
process, at least theoretically, provides equal opportunity to all citizens to seek a 
public office, but in reality landlords/tribal leaders, big business and religious leaders 
tend to be the primary contestants. 
The data of five elections from 1985 to 1997, reveals that the representation of 
various classes and groups has shown some increase, but feudals/tribal leaders still 
continue to be the dominant class. Out of a total of 207 seats for the National 
Assembly (NA), they continue to retain on an average 125 seats. In the five 
elections, urban professionals (i.e. lawyers, doctors, technocrats), on the average, 
have been able to win 26, while businessmen/industrialists 38 seats. This is a healthy 
trend, but it does not reflect a corresponding behavioural change in the attitude of 
parliamentarians. The feudal norms and attitude continues to influence the 
behavioural pattern of the parliamentarians (see Table 2). A comprehensive data on 
the educational background of the members of the NA is not available. A sizeable 
number of 207 members of the NA do not have formal schooling. A small number, 
about ten percent, are proficient in English, while a larger majority (i.e. 95 percent) 
is conversant with Urdu. 
I have been able to collect some data on the composition of federal cabinets 
from 1985 to 1997. It reveals that, feudals, lawyers/professionals and business 
groups continue to dominate the federal cabinet. In the Junejo cabinet, feudals, 
lawyers/professionals  and  business  groups  were evenly spread. Therefore, in terms 
of social group representation, his cabinet could be considered most representative. 
The first Benazir cabinet, (1988–1990), was dominated by feudals and 
lawyers/professionals. The second Benazir cabinet, (1993–1996), was over-
whelmingly dominated by the feudals. It is interesting to note that the middle 
classes, which are not adequately represented in the NA were equally under-
represented in the Benazir cabinets. While, Nawaz Sharif’s cabinet, (1990–1993), 
was  dominated  by  business  groups (9), lawyers/professionals (12) and  the  feudals  
 
Table 2 
Social Class Background of National Assembly Members 
  1985 1988 1990 1993 1997 
Landlords  and  Tribal  Leaders  157 156 106 129 126 
Businessmen/Industrialists  54 20 38 37 39 
Urban  Professionals  18  9 46 26 32 
Religious  Leaders  6 15 11  8  3 
Retired  Military  Officers  – 7 3 5 2 
Others  3 – 3 3 2 
    207 207 207 207 
Source:  Compiled by Saeed Shafqat. Saeed Shafqat  37:4, 292
(12) were significantly represented. The second Nawaz Sharif cabinet, (1997-98), is 
extremely narrow-based. It is overwhelmingly dominated by professionals and 
business groups, and the size of feudals is significant. However, representation of 
middle classes has remained marginal in all the federal government cabinets from 
1985–1998 (see Table 3). The feudal/tribal social origins of the parliamentarians and 
their dominance in the federal cabinets reveals feeble commitment towards 
democratic norms. Thus processes that could promote mutual trust, accommodation, 
respect for dissent and consensus building—remain under developed. 
Not only the interpersonal trust is weak among the parliamentarians but they 
are also inadequately informed about the rules and procedures of parliamentary 
practice. They pay little attention to develop the National Assembly into a forum 
for discussing national issues and formulation of legislation. Parliamentary parties 
and their leadership has paid little attention towards developing their position on 
specific issues. 
During 13 years of parliamentary democracy 1985–1998, the NA not only 
held fewer sessions but its legislative performance has also been dismal. During the 
first Benazir Bhutto government, frequency of sessions was so low that only 11 
meetings were held. During her second tenure, the number of sessions rose to only 
31. During Nawaz  Sharif’s first term, the NA held 17 Sessions. During his 2nd term, 
20 sessions have been held. Duration of these sessions was short. It is plausible that 
either the NA did too little or had no legislative work. During Junejo’s government, 
parliament held longer sessions, shows that it met for debate and also did some 
legislative work (see Table 4). 
 
Table 3 
Composition of Cabinets 1985–1998: Federal Ministries and Ministers of State 
 Feudals Business 
Lawyers/ 
Professionals Generals Women  Ulema  Minorities Unidentified Total 
M.K. Junejo  
  1985–88  12  3  8  2  1  1  –  – 
27 
Benazir Bhutto 
  1988–90  15  1 14  3  4  –  1 6 
44 
Nawaz Sharif 
  1990–93  12  9  12  1  –  1  2  2 
39 
Benazir Bhutto 
  1993–96  17  3  13  2  1  –  1  2 
39 
Nawaz Sharif 
  1997  8 6  8  1  2 –  –  1  26 










Mohammad Khan Junejo 
P.M. 1985–88  15  545  36 
Benazir Bhutto 
P.M. 1988–90  11  218  20 
Nawaz Sharif 
P. M. 1990–93  17  417  25 
Benazir Bhutto 
P.M. 1993–96  31  525  17 Days 
Nawaz Sharif 
P. M. Feb. 1997 – March 1998  20 140  7  Days 
Source:  Secretary, National Assembly, Islamabad. Compiled by Saeed Shafqat. 
 
From the above analysis, it is evident that the NA has not been able to develop 
into a forum, which may inform, educate and reflect the opinion of citizens or 
representative interest groups. Parliamentarians have made little effort to develop 
consensus on important legislation. Invariably, it is through Ordinance, rather than 
through debate, that the legislation, if any, has been adopted. The parliamentarians 
and political parties have not been able to bring diverse and divergent interests and 
issues for debate and resolution in the NA. Therefore, extra-parliamentary tactics 
continue to dominate Pakistani politics. Major national issues are debated and 
managed outside the parliament (over the years, no meaningful discussion on 
Kashmir, sectarian problem or India’s nuclear explosion etc. has taken place in the 
NA). Thus, NA has not been able to develop as an institution that could promote and 
strengthen democratic norms and practices. If parliamentary democracy has to 
succeed, regular sessions of the assembly, greater debate, more legislative work 
needs to be created to enhance the capacity of the NA. 
 
(4)  Political Parties and Challenges of Democratic Development 
Pakistan has been struggling to sustain political parties as an instrument of 
interest representation and popular will. In the past 51 years, political parties have 
endured, (despite Martial Laws and other Presidential interventions). Political parties 
remain instruments of patronage and mass mobilisation. The political parties have 
yet to acquire the skills of interest representation in the parliament. Given mass 
mobilisation orientation, the political leadership uses political parties for street 
demonstration and politics of agitation. So political parties have developed and 
grown into effective tools for extra-parliamentary politics, but they continue to have 
limited utility for promoting democratic norms and performing legislative/rule 
making functions in the parliament. The challenge for the party leadership in Saeed Shafqat  37:4, 294
Pakistan is to transform the character of political party from an instrument of mass 
mobilisation to interest representation and advocacy in the parliament. 
An outstanding feature of party politics in Pakistan has been the making and 
breaking of alliances and coalitions. However, coalition-building within the 
parliament has remained weak and inconsistent. Bipartisan or multi-party consensus 
on a particular issue has rarely developed. (Recently, on two occasions political 
parties have demonstrated consensus, first, on removing the Eighth Amendment and 
passing 13th Amendment. Second, adopting a Bill revising the salary and pay 
structure of the MNAs.) The opposition parties and the government (party in power) 
instead of engaging in a dialogue, and developing a national consensus indulge in 
politics of hostility and confrontation. The party in power invariably seeks to exclude 
opposition parties and attempts to establish dominance. In turn, the opposition 
parties, venture to build an extra-parliamentary alliance, simultaneously they attempt 
to resort to street protest and mass mobilisation against the government. Their basic 
aim is to dislodge the government rather than engage in dialogue. (For example, 
Democratic Action Committee (DAC) 1968, Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) 
1977, Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) 1983, Islami Jamhuri 
Ittehad (IJI) 1988 and Pakistan Awami Tehrik, (PAT) 1998.) Invariably, such 
coalitions are built only because the opposition political parties are inadequately 
represented in the NA, and thus, they have little stake in the parliament. They 
pressurise the government or the president to dissolve the assembly. Since 1988 (i.e. 
removal of Junejo government), there is evidence to suggest that the military and the 
president have acted in concert to dislodge the elected governments in 1990 and 
1993. In 1996, the president and the judiciary were perceived by the public as 
playing a critical role in the dismissal of the Benazir government. 
Despite making struggle for the restoration of democracy, political leaders, 
élites and interest groups, have failed to build a legal framework, create a pro-
democracy environment, and most importantly, develop a policy framework in 
which conflicts may be resolved inside the parliament. Ironically the 
parliamentarians adopt policies that strengthen authoritarian attitudes rather than 
promote democratic norms, respect for law or tolerance of any political opposition. 
For example, the current Nawaz Sharif government has passed legislation in haste 
that curtailed the powers of the president, passed anti-defection clause that bound 
members to party discipline. Even the PML (N) party leadership did not discourage 
supporters to attack the Supreme Court building in November 1997. The formation 
of Khidmat Committees, Ehtsab Cell and Open Kutcheries are some of the methods 
that show authoritarian tendencies and weaken the position of representative 
institutions.  
The political parties of Pakistan are witnessing a decline, if not death of the 
militant party worker. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, political parties needed and 
dependent on militant party workers, who were ideologically motivated, dedicated, Democracy: Value Change and Challenges of Institution Building  37:4, 295
campaigned for party, raised funds, organised the workers in a factory or supporters 
in the Mohalla, put up party posters, advocated party line or ideology. They kept the 
party organisation intact, and provided a certain social service. In the 1990s, this has 
changed, a militant worker or a party “Jiala” has declined. He has been replaced by a 
media advisor, who portrays the programme, image, slogans of the party through 
electronic and print media. Party worker has been replaced by image-builder for the 
party and its leaders. There is growing tendency among the top ranking party 
leadership to fax statement to the newspapers rather than focus on building the grass 
root organisation of the party. 
 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY OPTIONS 
From the foregoing analysis, it is evident that the results of Pakistan’s 
experimentation with parliamentary democracy (particularly for the last 13 years) are 
mixed. Several contradictory trends are noteworthy. First, political leaders continue 
to reveal lack of commitment to the principles of democracy and, above all, have 
found it difficult to develop the National Assembly as the primary forum for national 
debate, dialogue and legislation. To make parliamentary democracy succeed, the 
parliamentarians need to strengthen the parliament. Confidence in electoral 
competition has to be matched by parliamentary performance. The challenge for the 
parliamentarians is to enhance the legislative and consensus building capacity of the 
NA.  
Secondly, significant transformation in the electoral competition has led to the 
integration of a number of regional parties, like ANP, BNP, MQM, JWP and BNA 
with the national political system. This has diffused separatist tendencies and 
encouraged confidence in the democratic process. The smaller provinces are more 
demanding and assertive to expand their share in the federal structure. Transition to 
democracy has strengthened the federal character of Pakistani state. This has given 
boost to devolution of administrative authority. Electoral process has accelerated the 
pace for such a change at the provincial level. After each election, the structural 
presence of the elected officials has gained ground. However, there are two negative 
fall out effects: (i) partisanship has compromised the neutrality and fairness of 
administrative institutions; and (ii) the majoritarian view of democracy of the ruling party 
has roused skepticism among the smaller provinces. Unless these actions are reversed or 
resolved through deliberations, it could further deepen the crisis of governance. 
Thirdly, there is a growing awareness among the public that dynastic character 
of the political parties is an obstacle for the development of democracy and party 
system. In recent years, some muted voices of reform from within the political 
parties have also appeared but with little effect. The challenge for the leadership, 
both in the government and the opposition, is to reform and democratise the 
structures of political parties. Reformed and democratised political parties are the 
best guarantee for a democratic order, its continuity and stability.  Saeed Shafqat  37:4, 296
Fourthly, global trend towards democratisation, has restricted the possibility 
of direct military intervention, although, apparently, from a distance, the military will 
continue to monitor and influence the direction of political process. Therefore, in the 
foreseeable future, Pakistan’s transition to democracy will endure pain, occasional 
violence, conflict and corruption. This is worrisome and not a good omen for 
consolidation of democracy. 
Fifthly, the growth and expansion of print media is the most positive outcome 
of democratisation, it augurs well for democratic consolidation in the country. 
Freedom of the press is a irreversible trend and lends support to continued 
sustenance of democratic process in the country. 
Finally, democracy has become an expensive form of government. The 1985 
election costed the Government of Pakistan around 17 crore rupees (170 Million). In 
1993, the cost had risen to 41 crore rupees (410 Millions). In 1988, on an average a 
candidate contesting  for the National Assembly seat spent around Rs 5 Lakh (.5 
Million). In the 1997 election, cost of NA seat had risen to Rs 50 Lakh (5 Million). This 
suggests that only big landlords, businessmen and, in few cases, urban professionals 
could contest elections. In order to sustain and consolidate democracy and encourage the 
representation of middle classes, the costs of electoral competition need to be lowered. 
There are signs of discontent of middle classes in the urban centres, where resentment is 
growing against the ineffectiveness of democratically elected government to provide 
justice and security to citizens. Failure to meet this challenge, could deepen crisis of 
governance and cause social upheaval, anarchy and mass agitation. 
This can be averted through a concerted effort on the part of government and 
opposition political parties to engage in a dialogue on the broader goal of how to 
sustain and build democratic institutions? Democracy in Pakistan is at cross roads 
and a future vision demands building consensus on the following: 
  (1) continuity of free and fair elections; 
  (2)  rights of the political opposition to operate without restrictions by 
curtailing the arbitrary powers of the state especially through extra-judicial 
killings, torture under detention, etc; 
  (3)  protection of minorities and civil liberties; 
 (4)  security  of  citizens’ life and promote conditions that improve quality of 
individual; 
  (5)  an independent judiciary to check state power; and 
  (6)  an agenda for bipartisan consensus on social and economic policies. 
 
All these objectives may not necessarily be achieved at the same time or in a 
certain sequence; some may prove to be more difficult than others. Some may even 
prove to be elusive in the end. But there is no short-cut to democracy and 
democratisation of state and society. If we have to develop into a viable democratic 
society, we have to move in the right direction and sooner the better. Democracy: Value Change and Challenges of Institution Building  37:4, 297
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